This paper draws a distinction between the set of explicit beliefs of a reasoner, the "belief base", and the beliefs that are merely implicit. We study syntax-based belief changes that are governed exclusively by the structure of the belief base. In answering the question whether this kind of belief change can be reconstructed with the help of something like an epistemic entrenchment relation in the sense of G~rdenfors and Makinson [8], we extract several candidate relations from a belief base. The answer to our question is negative, but an approximate solution is possible, and in some cases the agreement is even perfect. Two interpretations of the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment are offered. It is argued that epistemic entrenchment properly understood involves multiple belief changes, i.e., changes by sets of sentences. Since none of our central definitions presupposes the presence of propositional connectives in the object language, the notion of epistemie entrenchment becomes applicable to the style of knowledge representation realized in inheritance networks and truth maintenance systems.
Introduction

Representation of beliefs
Our model of belief will be a simple one. A belief is represented by a sentence in some (regimented) language. Research done in Artificial Intelligence has recently lead to a revival of the logic of belief. It was felt that a clear distinction should be drawn between the explicit and the implicit beliefs of a reasoner [14, 18] . The former ones are those that the reasoner would assent to if asked and for which he has some kind of independent warrant. The latter ones are those that follow, by some specified logic, from the set of explicit beliefs.
We distinguish a belief base, the set of explicit beliefs, from a belief set. A belief set is closed under logical consequences, it is a theory in the logician's sense. In general, we conceive of belief sets as generated by belief bases. Let us say that H is a belief base for the belief set K if and only if K is the set of all logical consequences of H, i.e., if K = Cn(H).
We must make a decision what to count as a belief state. A belief state is that kind of thing, pre-theoretically understood, that is changed when we change our beliefs. As we cannot read off from a belief set K which beliefs in it are the explicit ones, a belief state cannot be just a belief set. Should we then say that a belief state is modelled by a belief base H? Of course, we then have no problem in generating the full belief set, provided we have fixed an appropriate logic Cn. So everything ! 40
we could possibly want to know about the set of currently entertained beliefs can be answered if" H is known. However, as we shall see, there is a dynamical problem with this conception. In the sort of changes we shall consider, we cannot satisfy two desiderata at the same time: the desideratum that the changed belief state can be characterized by a belief base, and the desideratum that this belief base contains the set of explicit beliefs after the change has been effected. This is an unpleasant state of affairs which we shall have to put up with in this paper. Giving an answer to our question, we say that a belief state is a pair (H, K) such that H is a belief base for K. However, the reader be warned that our change operations are not making belief states out of belief states in response to a certain input. We shall explain this in the next section. Before doing that, let us delineate the object language and its logic. The logic of belief change, and especially the theory of epistemic entrenchment, has been discussed for a language with the expressiveness of propositional logic, including all its connectives -,, A, V, ~ and ~, as well as the truth and falsity constants T and Z. In contrast to this, we aim at reducing the linguistic prerequisites. Our considerations are to apply also to systems using severely restricted languages, as encountered e.g. in inheritance nets or truth (reason) maintenance systems.
Correspondingly, the logic governing our language has to obey only structural rules. We require that it is reflexive, monotonic, transitive, and compact. We refer to our logic either as a consequence operator Cn or as an inference relation F-, with the usual understanding that r E Cn(H) iff H ~-r In the first notation our four 
If r E Cn(H) then r E Cn(H') for some finite subset H' of H When we link our considerations to earlier work, we make use of connectives. Then the logic is further supposed to be supraclassical, i.e., what follows classically from a given premise set should follow from it in Cn. We also assume that Cn satisfies the deduction theorem.
Dynamics
A belief change occurs if a belief state is changed in order to accommodate it to a certain input. In the case we are going to deal with, the input comes in the form of (explicit) beliefs. In the research program initiated by AlchourrSn, Giirdenfors and Makinson ([3] ; for excellent surveys, see [6] and [16] ), belief states are identified with belief sets, and inputs are single sentences. Still working in broadly the same research program, Fuhrmann [4, 5] and Hansson [9, 10, 11] offer modetlings for two important generalizations. They investigate what happens when belief states are identified with belief bases (with belief sets as special eases) and when the input comes in sets of sentences (with singletons as special cases). In short, they generalize the theory of belief change to base changes and multiple changes.
